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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SAIJr LAIG1J CITY, a l\1unieipal \
Corporation,

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

J. B. and R. E. \VALKBR, TNC., a

7437

Corporation,

Defendant,

SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Intervenor.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Statement of Facts contained in Defendant's
Brief covers in a general way the facts .involved in this
controversy. The trial of the case consumed many days
and the voluminous transcript of the evidence contains
much testimony that would he of no, or little, relevancy
in this appeal. We feel that it would consume the court's
time and clarify the points at issue before this court if
we state the facts, as reflected by the record, as they
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are involved in each of the points relied on by Defendant
in this appeal, rather than to attempt an over all statement at this place. In answer to Defendant's Brief, we
shall proceed to answer Defendant's points in the order
in which they are stated.
ARGUMENT

I.
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1949, IS NOT ERRONEOUS IN
ITS ADJUDICATION THAT PLAINTIFF OWNS AND HOLDS
A RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS SECTION 25, TWP. 2 SOUTH,
RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, OF
A MINIMUM WIDTH OF 33 FEET OF EACH SIDE OF THE
CENTER LINE OF SAID CONDUIT, AS CONSTRUCTED,
FOR THE PROPER MAINTENANCE, REP AIR AND REPLACEMENT OF SAID CONDUIT.

Plaintiff in paragraph 2 of its Complaint (R. 1)
states that it owned a right of way for its conduit
through Sections 24 and 25, rrownship 2 South, Range
1 East, 66 feet wide and that said conduit was constructed along the center of said right of way. In its answer
Defendant admitted these allegations (R. 13) and it
was not until after the trial had ended and the court
and counsel were in the course of preparing the Findings of Fact that Defendant chose to challenge the allegations of the Complaint above mentioned. In paragraph
2 of the Findings of Fact (R. 72) the court found as
alleged in the Complaint and admitted in the answer
that Plaintiff owned a right of way 66 feet wide, its
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conduit being constructed along the center line thereof,
and that such right of way is necessary. The court then
provided that Defendant having moved to amend its
amnver to deny the alleged GG foot width of Plaintiff's
right of way and to re-open the case for the introduction
of evidence on said subject, and the court having granted
this portion of the motion, this finding might be altered
subsequently by the court as to the width of Plaintiff's
right of way in Section 25.
In paragraph 6 of the Decree (R. 69), dated September 1, 1949, the court reserved ";jurisdiction to hear evidence on and determine the width of the said right of way
in said Section 25 and to subsequently alter the provisions of this Decree pursuant to the finding that may
be made on the width of said right of way and the other
provisions to be affected thereby."
On September 28, 1949, Defendant served its supplemental answer ( R. 105), alleging that Plain tiff acquired its right of way over Section 25 by virtue of a
Deed from the Utah Light and Railway Company, dated
September 9, 1905 (which Deed is set out on page 4 of
Defendant's Brief). It is then alleged that the grantor
had previously constructed a dugway or ledge across
Section 25 and that Plaintiff constructed its conduit on
this dugway or ledge and so fixed the location of its right
of way; and since the conduit is 4-Vz feet wide the right
of way is only 4% feet wide. 'l'he allegation that the
Plaintiff constructed its conduit on this dugway or ledge
·was made notwithstanding it was known to be contrary
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to the facts, all of the evidence including the photographs
in evidence clearly showing that the conduit was constructed on a level approximately 8 feet lower than the
so called. dugway or ledge.
A hearing was held on this Supplemental Answer
and Plaintiff's reply thereto on N ovemher 2G, 1949.
Plaintiff objected to the reopening of this matter for
the reason that the allegations in the Supplemental Answer were frivolous and known to be at variance with
all of the facts of record. The court, however, decided
to hear the testimony. ~Without any objection, Defendant voluntarily undertook the burden of going forward
to prove the allegations of its answer. Mr. vValker testified (R. 910) that a right of way 14 feet wide would
hold the equipment needed to construct the conduit. To
this should be added the width of the trench, making
1G or 18 feet as the width of the right of way. 'l1here
was no attempt at all to prove a right of way 4% feet
wide. This was all of the Defendant's testimony.
Plaintiff called Charles V. Gardner, Assistant City
Engineer, W. D. Beers, City Engineer, and Hampton
Godbe. Mr. Gardner testified (R. 917, 920), that the ordinary right of way is not less than 50 feet on either
side; that "you could not get along with less than

(j(j

feet, and in most instances I would say that you would
need more." Mr. Gardner further testified that he was
familiar with the width of the rights of way granted up
and down the canyon for the City's conduit; that they
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are all GG fed wide cxeept one 491h feet \vide, there
being some twenty or more such grants. ::\fr. Beers testified (H. 926) that()() feet ''would llc the minimum on
those hillsides," for spoil dirt and roadway. ::\lr. Godhe
(H. 931 ), who proemed the rights of wa;., for the :Metropolitan Water Distriet of ~alt Lake Cjty f'o1' its Deer
Creek eonduit, H-:J- inehes outside diameter, in this same
area, testiiied that the minimum width proeured was
125 feet.
Upon the foregoing evidenee the court made Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Sup})lemental
Order and Judgment, to which Defendant objects under
Point I. In its prayer in its Supplemental Answer, Defendant prayed that the court declare the Plaintiff's
easement aeross Section 25 to be 4lj2 feet wide. In its
Findings of Fact on the supplemental answer, the court
iinds (H. 122), paragraph 4, that the grant of the easement does not state the width of the right of way given;
that the Plaintiff requires a minimum right of way of
33 feet on each side of the center line of the conduit as
constructed. This finding is supported by the Plaintiff's
evidence ahove referred to, which evidence clearly preponderates over that of the Defendant.
\Ve wish to emphasize here that Defendant did not,
by its Supplemental Ans\ver, deny that Plaintiff had a
GG foot right of way aeross Seetion 24, under its Deed
from ::\L H. llaynes, Exhibit "X," or that the conduit
was constructed along its center line. And in the hearing above outlined there wa::; absolutely no attempt made
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to call in question the original finding of the court (R.
72) that Plaintiff owned a 66 foot right of way across
Section 24, 33 feet on each side from the center line of
the conduit. \¥ e stress this point because if Defendant's
contention that the Plaintiff only had a 41;2 foot right
of way across Section 25 were to prevail, or even a right
of way 16 or 18 feet wide as testified by Mr. Walker,
then we would have the curious situation where the
right of way across Defendant's land in Section 24 would
be 66 feet wide and in the immediate adjoining Section
25 it would be abruptly narrowed to 41;2 feet or 16 or
18 feet, a situation that would present considerable difficulty in excavating the gravel deposit and leaving the
proper support for the conduit and its right of way.
The rule of law that governs easements where the
width is not stated in the grant is stated in 28 C .•J.S.
p. 757, Section 77, as follows:

"It is a well settled rule of easements that,
where there is no stated width in a grant creating
a right of way, the grantee is entitled to a suitable and convenient way, which will he determined by its sufficiency to afford ingress and
egress to the owner and occupants of the dominant
estate, what is suitable and convenient being dependent upon the purposes of the grant and the
circumstances of the case. 'l'hus, if the grant
states merely the object for which the way is
granted, the dimensions must he inferred to be
such as are reasonably sufficient for the accomplishment of that object."
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2 Thompson on Real Property, Section 575, p. 181,
says:
"In case the width of a right of ·way is not
specified in the grant, and is not determinable
therefrom, the scope and purpose of the deed
creating it, the situation and use of the property,
and the intent of the parties will he considered,
so as to provide a reasonable, safe, and convenient way for the purposes for which it was
intended."
The City, in its Complaint, asserts it has a 66 foot
right of way. rrhe court, upon the evidence above referred to, found and gave .T udgment that the City required
a minimum width of 66 feet. ']'he City not claiming a
greater width, this finding and the Judgment declaring
that a GG foot right of way is required, definitely fixed
that width as the width of the easement. The conduit,
having been constructed, the location of the right of
way thereby became fixed. Knowing the location of the
conduit, which is in place and readily observed and discoverable, the outer edges of the right of way can be
easily and definitely established on the ground. The
slopes of safety established by the main decree thus
have a definite, fjxed ha::;e and starting point. There is
no uncertainty. The width is definitely fixed at 33 feet
on each side of the center line of the conduit.
1. THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT IS
SUPPORTED BY THE SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1949.

What has been said above cover::; this subdivision
of Point I. The court did not refuse to find the width
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of the right of way. The court said it was not necessary
to find the exact width of the right of way granted by
the Utah Light and Railway Company to the Plaintiff
in order to dispose of the issues before it. Olwiously
the exact width intended to he granted, not being contained in the deed, eould not under any circumstances
be determined, the persons representing the grantor
and grantee not being available. Rut the court could
find, from the evidence before it, and it did Jind what
minimum width was required to make the grant reasonably effective. It found that Plaintiff required a minimum of 33 feet on each side of the center line of the
conduit. Its finding was more restrictive than Defendant was entitled to. It eould have been more liberal
than to fix a minimum. A minimum is the least possible.
rrhe court could have fixed something more than the
least and still have come within the rule of what would
be reasonably necessary.
The Supplemental Judgment simply refused to alter
the original Findings of Fact and Decree. The original
Findings of Fact, paragraph 2 (R. 72), found Plaintiff
had and owned a GG foot right of way, the conduit being
in the center, and the Decree, paragravh 1 (R G5),
definitely fixes the lower outer edge of Plaintiff's right
of way as :3i3 feet from the center line of the conduit
measured on a horizontal plane at right angles to said
center line. rl'he slope of safety for the support of the
right of way, referred to in the Decree, line B G, on
Exhibit "A," attached to Defendant's Brief, has its he-

ginning at a point :3:3 feet horizontally from the center
of the eondui t, and that point is fixed hy the main Decree.
There can he no uncertainty, therefore, as to where the
slop{' of" sal\:t)' for either the right of way or the eondnit
has its heginning or the course that it nms down the
hillside.
In R Am . .Jur. Section GR, p. 79-1-, is the following:
'"In measuring up and down mountain sides
or over other steep acclivities or depressions to
constitute a legal survey, the chain mnst he
leveled so as to approximate, to a reasonable
extent, a horizontal measurement and not along
or upon the surface; this is a legal rule which
local custom as to surface measurements cannot
change."
2. THE COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT DO SUPPORT THE SUPPLEMENTAL JUDGMENT
ADJUDGING PLAINTIFF THE OWNER OF A RIGHT OF
WAY 33 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE CENTER LINE
OF ITS CONDUIT.

The court found as a fact that Plaintiff required a
right of way with a minimum of 33 feet on each side the
center line of the conduit. Since the deed granting the
right of way did not fix the width, the court was required
to ilnd what width would reasonably he required to a
full enjoyment and use of the easement. Having found
that width to he ;{;) feet on each side the center line
of the conduit, under the authorities above cited, and
those cited hy Defendant, that supplied the omission
in the grant and fixed the width. 'l'he deed admittedly
granted the easement, and the width found h)T the court
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as the mmnnum became its width. Having found the
width required, and it being admitted that there was
a conveyance of the easement, then it followed, as a
Conclusion of Law, that Plaintiff, under the conveyance,
owns and holds an easement of the width found necessary. And the court did just that. It concluded as a
matter of law, from such Finding of Fact, "that Plaintiff
owns and holds a right of way and easement " " " having
a minimum width of 33 feet on each side of the center
line of the conduit as constructed across Section 25."

II.
THE PART OF FINDING OF FACT 2 WHICH FINDS
THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT IS CONSTRUCTED AND
INSTALLED ALONG THE CENTER OF RIGHT OF WAY
66 FEET WIDE IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THE
LOCATION OF SAID CONDUIT ON SAID RIGHT OF WAY
WAS PROVED AND IS KNOWN.

It should be remembered, in considering the Defendant's argument under this point, that the case went to
trial on Defendant's admission in its Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint that Plaintiff owned and held a right
of way, across both Section 24 and 25, 66 feet wide and
that the conduit was constructed and installed along
the center line thereof. At the time the Findings of
Fact were drawn and signed by the court, the Answer
of Defendant had not been amended; the admission above
referred to still constituted Defendant's pleading. No

evidence was necessary to prove that which was admitted. It is true the court, in the Findings and Decree,
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gave Defendant permission to file an amended Answer
and re-open the case to take testimony on the width of
the right of way across Section 25. But until Defendant
chose to file his amended Answer and move to re-open
the ease for further evidence, this original Answer still
stood. The Findings of Fact were, and continued to be,
supported hy Defendant's admission.
rrhere is here, and there can be, no question but
that the conduit was constructed on the center line of
the GG foot right of way granted by Haynes to the City
across Section 24. That is alleged and admitted and
found by the court. Defendant did not amend its Answer
to challenge that fact and the hearing on the Supplemental Answer was restricted to taking evidence as to
whether the City required a right of way 66 feet wide
across Section 25.
Under this division of its Brief Defendant refers
to certain Testimony of Charles V. Gardner to show
that he assumed the right of way through Section 25
was 66 feet wide and the conduit was constructed along
the center thereof. Under the state of the pleadings
when Mr. Gardner, and likewise W. H. Staker, whose
testimony is also referred to, testified neither the width
of the right of way nor the position of the conduit thereon was in issue. Both the 66 foot width and the position
of the conduit in the center were admitted facts. Therefore, Gardner did not have to assume anything. Counsel
asserts that in preparing the original tracing from which
]~xhibit ".J" was taken, the draftsman assumed the right
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of way over Section 25 was GG feet wide. ~"l_1his tracing
was made in 1908. It is entirely possible, and probable,
the width of GG feet was established hy mutual agreement by the Railway Company and the City or on the
ground when the survey was made. The fact is that
width has been shown on the engineer's records from
the very heginning. Is it to he assumed that such an
original and ancient record is based on assumption
alone~ It is indeed singular that Defendant does not
question that the right of way in every other place than
in Section 25 was GG feet wide along its entire course
as shown by Exhibit ".J" and that the conduit was constructed in the center thereof. ~"Jlhere is nothing to indicate that in constructing the conduit across Section 25
the Plaintiff required or used a right of way of a width
other than that acquired by the other grants.
But whether the testimony of the witnesses referred
to at the trial, or the tracing, I•Jxhibit ".J," given and
admitted in evidence when the pleadings already established the facts, are in and of themselves sufficient or not
to establish the width of the right of way across Section
25, the court, upon Defendant's re-opening of the cm;e,
did find upon good and substantial evidence, heretofore
referred to, that the right of way required by the City
was (i(i feet wide, :33 feet on each side of the center line
of the conduit. 'That established both the width and the
position of the conduit. The court, after taking evidence
on the matter, settled both the question as to the width
of the right of way and the location of the conduit thereon.
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III.
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 OF THE
JUDG;\IENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, WHICH PROHIBITS DEFENDANT AND INTERVENOR FROivi REl\lOVING SAND, ROCKS, GRAVEL, ETC., FROM PLAINTIFF'S
RIGHT OF WAY, AND REQUIRES DEFENDANT TO RESTORE THE PLACES ON SAID RIGHT OF WAY FROM
WHICH SOIL, ROCKS, GRAVEL, ETC., HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY FILLING DECLIVITIES WITH SOIL, ETC.,
AND REPLANTING WITH VEGETATION ARE NOT ERRONEOUS.
l~nder

this voint Defendant takes exeeption to varagraph 1 of the main Decree, dated September 1, 19-1-9,
wherein Defendant is enjoined from removing soil or
roeks from the surface of Plaintiff's right of way, a
width of 3:3 feet from the lower side of the conduit, and
requiring Defendant to restore the surface where it
ha:-; heen disturbed. It is well to point out here that as
to the :33 feet on the upper side of the conduit the Defendant had not, at the time of the trial, disturbed or
removed any part of the natural surface.
If we understand Defendant's po:sition under this
point elearly it i:-; that there is no evidence that Defendant disturbed the surface within this 33 feet from the
conduit on the lower side. Defendant quotes the testimony of .J. B. Walker to the effect that the only disturbance made of the surface of the slope below the
conduit, and within 40 feet thereof, was done hy the
lmll(lozer's eleats and :such disturbance was very small
an(l ineonsequential.

li

J
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However, the testimony of Doctor R. E. Marsell,
Professor of Geology at the University of Utah, a witness
called by Plaintiff, is clearly to the contrary. He made
a detailed observation and study of this area all during
the winter of 1948 and on through 1949. He also took
photos of the area which were made into colored slides.
These slides were exhibited to the trial court through
a projector. 'l'he testimony given by Doctor Marsell in
explanation of each photo begins at page 304 of the
record and continues to page 329, and embraces 27
separate photos or slides. On the precise issue raised
by Defendant under its Point III, Doctor Marsell had
a photo taken the latter part of March, 1949, slide No.
1841, being the eighteenth slide projected before the
court (R. 319), which showed the Defendant's workings
on the slope within the distance of 33 feet from the
center of the conduit. On this subject the witness testified (R. 319) that picture No. 1841 shows a short section
of the slope and then the steep embankment which has
been produced by the benching method of removing
gravel in these workings. He describes the conditions
shown by this picture and then says (R. 320):
"The first work I observed on this particular
slope, apparently was done by the blade of a
bulldo"'er where the blade stripped it down parallel with the slope and the gravel was scraped
down the slope on an average of 18 inches of that
original surface and the plant covering, the brush
covering, and the natural surface was destroyed
by removing the grass. I measured the upper
edge of that cut last .June and again in .July and
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at frequent intervals since. That cut comes within 8 feet of the center line of the conduit. rrhat
has, of course, removed the natural surface, to
date, a distance of 94 feet below the conduit, permitting this raw gravel, as I have observed it, to
absorb in the normal amount of water, melting
snow and rain, so that the steep bank below has
become saturated by the water and may collapse."
In further explanation of the distance of 94 feet he
testified:
"That was the distance that the protective
surface of grass and accumulated rocks was removed by scraping down the slope. rrhat \vas the
horizontal distance measured, parallel with the
conduit at that point, which was the earliest
workings as I recall, in this part, the upper part
of the pit."
Speaking further of this 94 feet the witness says
(R. 321):

"That is a horizontal distance parallel with
the conduit. Following the conduit within 94
feet, the original grassy surface that we saw in
the first and second pictures that were displayed,
that grass, the natural surface, has been destroyed throughout this horizontal distance, that
is 94 feet along the conduit following the conduit."
He further testified that about 8 feet from the conduit is where the removal of this gravel actually began,
8 feet measured on the slope from the center line of the
conduit (R. 321).
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He further testified that between the late part of
the fall 194-R, and April 7, 1~)49, the steep hank shown
on the picture above referred to and slides numbers
1842 and 1843 "had retreated 12 feet by slumping and
ravelling as a matter of actual measurement," (H.:323),
which slumping and receding was entirely due to erosion. He testified that the rim of this perpendicular
hank >vas approximately GO feet from the center line
of the conduit, so that between the fall of 194R and
April 7, 1949, that rim had receded up the hill 12 feet
or one ftfth of the distance to the conduit. The raw
surface near the conduit is also shown on picture 1845
(R. 325). He testified, "it is a picture that shows the raw
surface, that was developed in the upper part of the
gravel pit, by scraping away the natural surface that
formerly covered this area." 'rhis bare surface goes
on up to about 8 feet from the center line of the conduit
(H. 32G).
In connection with Exhibits "'11 " and "U," which
are a series of ground profiles to represent the actual
ground surface at the Walker Gravel Pit as surveyed hy
the witness, he again refers to this area within 8 feet
of the conduit where the natural surface had been removed to within 8 feet of the conduit by scraping the
gravel off in vertical sections to a depth of 18 inches
or more (R. :340).
This testimony clearly indicates that there was substantial removal of material hom the area found by the
court to be within Plaintiff's right of way or 33 feet
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fr01n the center line of the conduit. In addition the court
vi::;ited thi~ area and ~aw for him~elf that the te~timony
of ::\1 r. vValker, quoted in Defendant'~ brief \Va~ incorrect, to ~ay tlw lea~t. Counst:l again argued that the
width of the right of wa:, and location of the conduit
thereon mu~t be a~sumed. \Ve think enough ha~ been
said heretofore to refute that po~ition and shall not
SJlell(l further time or space on that matter.
\Ve

~ulnnit

that the removal of lS inches of the top

soil or overburden
right under

wa~

a serious invasion of Plaintiff's

it~ ea~ement.

As

te~titied

to by Doctor ]\far-

sell it removed the protective mantle which had been
long in being created; it opened up

porou~

material

for the accumulation of moisture which would tend to
cause the bank below to slough and collapse, and which
would permit

fa~ter

'l'he removal of

thi~

erosion on the right of way itself.
top 18 inches could be of

no benefit to Defendant for gravel

purpo~es.

ah~olutely

l\fr. Walker

claims he never came within 40 feet of the conduit which
\vould indieate that he had not attempted to remove the
gravel from

thi~

'J'he removal of

33 feet immediately below the conduit.
thi~

protective mantle

wa~

of no utility

to Defendant hut it had seriou::; consequences, according
to Doctor l\larse11, so far as the safety of Plaintiff's
conduit i::; concerned. \Ve submit that Defendant had
no right to enter the boundaries of the right of way
and conduct operations that would

inerea~e

erosion and
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increase the burden of the Plaintiff in maintaining the
right of way and protecting its conduit. There can be
no balancing of equities here under these conditions.
1. While Defendant owned the fee to the land occupied by Plaintiff's right of way it did not have the right
to remove the soil, rocks, gravel, etc.J from the right of
way.

We do not dispute the proposition that, where there
is not an exclusive grant of an easement, the owner of
the servient tenament may make such use of the land
as will not impair the enjoyment of the easement and
endanger it. The rule is stated as follows in 28 C.J.S. p.
771, Section 91 :
"Since, however, the rights of the owner of
the easement are paramount, to the extent of the
grant, to those of the owner of the soil, the latter
cannot make any use of his property which
obstructs the em;ement or is incompatible with
its existence, or which renders the exercise by
the owner of the easement of his rights unreasonable, difficult, or burdensome. In determining if
the use made by the owner of the servient tenament is consistent with the rights of the owner
of the easement, the court should consider the
nature of the easement and the limitations placed
on it by acts of the parties as well as the interpretation of the agreement made in the easement."
At p. 772 is the following:
wrhe use of the servient owner must be reasonable and not such as will injure, impair, or
obstruct the enjoyment of the way by the grantee
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or subject him to extra labor and expense in
keeping it in repair; and the owner of the way
may restrict such use of it by the owner of the
servient tenament as is inconsistent with the
enjoyment of the easement."
This court in Stevens vs. Bird-Jex Company, 81
Utah 355, 18 P. 2nd 292, quotes from 19 C.J. 977, Section 877, as follows:
"The owner of the servient estate may use
his property in any manner and for any purpose
consistent with the enjoyment of the easement,
and the owner of the dominant estate cannot
interfere with this use."
The court goes on to say:
"He may himself use the way, or permit
others to do so, subject to the limitations that
his use or the use of his permittee must not
be such as to impair the enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant estate, or subject him to extra expense in keeping it in repair."
The question that divides the parties here is not
one of law. It is a question of fact. r:I'he court believed,
and the evidence referred to above clearly supports
such belief, that Defendant removed soil, rocks, gravel,
vegetation and the protective surface mantle from an
area 94 feet long within Plaintiff's 33 foot right of way
to a point 8 feet from the center line of the conduit.
The evidence further discloses, as above outlined,
that this constituted a serious injury to Plaintiff's
easement rights. r:I'o repeat, it created an open, porous
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and loose surface which permitted the ero::·nve forces
to operate, saturating the underground so that the rmnk
within 27 feet of the lower edge of the right of way
slumped and sloughed off a distance of 12 feet in one
winter. It destroyed the surface for the passage of
equipment for repair, replacement, and maintenance
purposes. Tt ehanged the contour of the right of way
and exposed the surface to within 8 feet of the center
of the conduit to fast erosion. Unless restored it would
add to the work and expense of maintaining the right
of way and the neeessary support of the conduit. In
other words, the removal of this material was incompatible with Plaintiff's easement rights and rendered
the exercise of those rights more difficult and burdensome. Finally such removal of material was wholly
unnecet>sary to the operation of Defendant's gravel pitit was of no utility to Defendant whatever. ·walker himself testified, as already pointed out and quoted in Defendant's Brief, pages 54 to 57, in an attempt to answer
or justify this invat>ion of the right of way, that Defendant did not remove any material within 40 feet of the
conduit; the slope was too steep for a bulldozer; and the
only invasion of the

:·3:~

foot area was made by the hull-

dozer backing up and its cleats making inconsequential
marks in the surface.
'l'he testimony of Doctor Marsell demonstrating the
danger to the conduit by the removal of thit> protective
mantle is found in the record from pages 317 to 32G
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and is to be seen graphically in the photo slides therein
refened to and numhered 1Ri39 to lR-+5 inclusive.

1t is eonclusive, therefore, that what Defendant did
within the ;);) foot right of wa~', in the way of' removing
soil and earth material, was not because sueh operations
were at all necessary to Defendant's gravel operations
aeeonling to 11r. \V alker himself. The fad that the eourt
lwl ie'.'E'd and found from the eviderwe of Doctor M arsell,
all(>\ P rdened to, and from a pen;onal inspedion at the
scene, that Defendant did remove soil and material from
the right of way does not justify Defendant now in taking the position that it had a right to do so because
this material belonged to it as the fee owner and was
a necessar~· part of its gravel operations.
Defendant asserts that the court's mandate to restore this surface "prohibits the Defendant from using
its land for its most valuable purpose," the removal of
gravel. From this it would appear that, while at the trial
Defendant disclaimed having removed any such gravel
and material, he now claims the right to haul away
\vhaten~r gravel may be found in the right of 'Nay and
leave the conduit suspended in mid air. True, counsel
pointed out that Defendant cannot imperil the safety
of the eonduit. But how can Defendant remove the gravel
and still not imperil the

conduit~

Furthermore, the

duty of Def(mdant is not limited to refraining from
imperiling the conduit. Plaintiff has the right of passag(~

along the right of way for construction, repmr,
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maintenance, and replacement. How can this right be
preserved and still permit Defendant to remove the
gravel? The picture slides, together with Doctor Marsell's explanation of them, referred to above, demonstrates beyond any question that Defendant's operation, both within and without the 33 foot right of way,
imperiled the conduit. The conditions on the ground,
viewed by the court after the trial, also completely
demonstrated that fact.
2. We feel that what has already been said completely answers Defendant's contention that the removal
of soil did not imperil the safety of the conduit. However, there is an inaccuracy in Defendant's reference
to paragraph 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint to which we
feel we should call the court's attention. That paragraph
alleged that to fill in the excavation made by Defendant
in the hillside and restore the natural slope of the
mountainside, not alone along the 33 foot right of way,
would require 4480.9 cubic yards of material. However,
when \Valker testified, apparently in an attempt to dispute this figure, as quoted in the Brief, pages G8 and G9,
his computation of 102.22 cubic yards was based upon
a removal of material 18 inches deep, 23 feet wide and
80 feet long. This, of course, would be entirely confined
to the right of way and not the slope down the mountainside. F'urthermore, it was inaccurate even as to that
portion of the slope as Doctor Marsell had testified the
earth material had been removed over a space 94 feet
long, 14 feet more than \V alker computed.
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IV.
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH FIVE OF THE
JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, ARE NOT
ERRONEOUS NOR INCONSISTENT WITH FINDING FOURTEEN.

It may he coneeded that some disturhanee of the
natural slope and surfaee conditions took place in the
construction of the eonduit. .Just what that disturbance
amounted to, exeept in the fills across ravines, would
not now be pereeptible. There is no evidence at all
that sueh disturbance in any wise affects any right
of the Defendant to remove gravel under the terms
of the Deeree.

In paragraph 4 (R. 73) of the Findings the court
found that the slope whereon the conduit was loeated
in Section 24 and 25, in its natural condition, was so
eovered with vegetation and earth material that so long
as sueh surfaee down the slope from Plaintiff's right
of way remained undisturbed in its natural eondition,
the same afforded, and would eontinue to afford, support to said right of way. This would be true regardless
of the steepness of the slope. And it appeared in the
evidence that there were sueh natural slopes steeper
in piteh than the slopes of safety found by the eourt
in the area disturbed by Defendant's workings. In order
to give Defendant the right to remove a maximum of
the gravel deposit on the lower part of the natural slope
that was steep at the upper part near the right of ~-
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hut more gentle towards the bottom, the eourt found
in paragraph 14 (R. 77), when sueh steep natural slopes
existed next to the right of way and were of substantial
length, namely, 50 feet or more from a point 2 feet
above the outside UIJIH~r corner of the conduit, point
"X" on the attaehed sketch J<~xhihit ''A," that sueh a
steev slope could lJe continued on down lJy removing
material from the lower gentle slove and such slope
would he a slope of safety, provided it was dressed and
provided with a growth of vegetation comparable to that
~which existed on the uvper steep natural ~·dope. 'l'his
provision modifies the general finding of the court that
a slope of safety, where the slope is denuded of its ]Jrotective mantle of vegetation, rock, etc., is two feet hori"'ontal to one foot vertical, as found in paragraph 15 (a)
and (b) of the Findings of Fact (R. 78). rl'his modif1cation is for Defendant's benefit so that it need not leave
a slope as gentle as bvo to one where a steeper natural
slope exist::; for a distance of 50 feet or more measured
from a point two feet above the outer edge of the eonduit.
Defendant purports to see an inconsistency or ambiguity, between the Findings of Faet, paragravh 14, vvhich
makes provision for the ahove modification of the staJHlard slope of safet~· estahl ished by the court, and paragra]Jh 5 of the main ,Judgment which carries the I<'inding into effect. In the Finding the eourt, in deseribi11g
the natural slopes 50 feet or more in length, refers to
them as slopes "with their natural mantle of vegetation
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and rock as pn~sc~ntly exi~ting." 1n tlw .Judg1118nt the
court describes the~e slopes as "'l'he natural slopes as
the.\~ ex i steel on .T anuary 1, l$)4H, and where the.\• had
not hePn altt~red l1y man." Defendant ]llll")JOrts to see in
thes<> hl-o dP:·wri]Jtions sueh a vast distinction or incon~
sisten(·~- that Defendant is deprived of a valuable right
in his gran~! removing operation. 'L'he Defendant points
out tlmt wl!Pn the conduit was built, and when the Ftah
Haihnty ( 'ouqmn.\· made its bench on the hillside, the
slopPs wen~ disturbed hy the spoils being plaeC'd on the
slopes beneath. 'l'hose disturhanees O('em-red 111ore than
fort~· years ago in the ease of the eonduit and 1nore than
fifty years ago in the case of the Hailway's hench. '!'he
onl~· places vl"11ere these disturbances are at all perceptihle, and the only places where the slopes would in any
lllaterial wa.\· be altered, so far as any proof in the
n~eonl is concerned, are those places where the conduit
or bench crosses a ravine necessitating a fill. f3uch fill
would produce an artificial, or man made ~.;lope. These,
of course, were not the kind of slopes which the court
was providing for.
There is not the slightest evidence as to whether
the Railway Company spread any spoils on the slopes
beneath its bench. rl'hat is pure suppo~ition on the part
of the Defendant. As to the conduit, the excerpts quoted
frol!l the testimony of "\V. ll. Stakm· do not disclose
whether the amount of spoils left on the slopes helmv
the conduit after its construction, across Defendant's
laml, was substantial or inconsequential. So the court
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in the Findings, in speaking of natural slopes with the
natural mantle as it presently exists, not disturbed by
Defendant's workings, must have meant the same thing
as it described in the Judgment when it referred to a
natural slope undisturbed by man as of January 1, 1948.
Both refer to the natural slopes as they existed before
Defendant began its operations disturbing the slopes.
Our best description of this part of Defendant's brief
is that Defendant is professing to see a vast difference
between things which are in fact entirely the same.

v.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A SLOPE OF SAFETY
FOR THE CONDUIT AND A SLOPE OF SAFETY FOR THE
RIGHT OF WAY DOES NOT MAKE EITHER THE FINDINGS OR THE JUDGMENT ERRONEOUS.

In considering the issues before the court in this
case, it should be horne in mind that the easement here
involved encompasses both the problem of providing
and preserving lateral support for the conduit now in
place and a18o protecting the surface easement of passage
for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, repairing,
and replacing the conduit. No con8ideration has been
given to the possibility that Plaintiff might want to construct additional conduits, or even reservoirs, across
or upon the land owned by the Defendant. Under the
general language of the grant the Plaintiff has such
right.

But confining our8elve8 solely to this conduit

now in place, the question is not one of merely providing
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enough lateral support to it to keep it from collapsing.
The eonduit is a permanent installation. It carries more
than one half of the water supply of Salt Lake City.
It, or its replacement, will be there to convey this water
forever, so far as we can foresee.
On the other hand, Defendant's operations will
sooner or later come to an end when the gravel deposit
is removed. The material composing the mountainside
will be gone but enough of it must be retained to provide
the surface easement conveyed by the grant as well as
the lateral support to sustain both that easement and
the conduit, or its equivalent, now laid, or hereafter to
be laid, within the boundaries of that easement. The
conduit, and its concomitant easement, is in its nature
an eternal thing, while Defendant and its gravel operations, are, by contrast, ephemeral. rrhe problem before
the court was to preserve, over the future centuries,
as against the erosive and other forces of nature, both
the support for the conduit and the right of surface
passage that the exigencies of the unforseeable future
might require, and at the same time, permit a reasonably maximum present enjoyment of its property by
Defendant, the length of which, in time, depends entirely
upon the extent of the gravel deposit and the speed with
which it is removed.
The court found upon a very substantial preponderance of the evidence, as already outlined, that the Plaintiff required an easement of 33 feet on ach side the
center line of the conduit. That easement is as con-
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tinuous in its nature and life as 1s the conduit itself.
The (•onduit cannot be preserved without the easement.
'l'he 33 feet on each side the center line of the conduit
comprise that portion of D(~fendant's land which is conveyed hy the grant. And while it is eonveyed as an easement, for all praetieal purposes, it must (•arry with it
what \Vould amount to a fee, so far as the removal of
the supporting soil under the easement and the eonduit
is concerned, unless the Defendant eleets to fnmish artificial ~mpport to the right of way and conduit thereon.
Admittedly, Defendant could leave a perpendicular hank
at the edge of the right of way, or even excavate undt>rneath the right of \vay, if it furnished the proper Jlrotection against erosion and subsidence nnd the prover support by artificial means.
rl'he court was under the necessity of providing for
the protection of the surface easement required to properly repair, maintain, and replace the conduit. While
it found generally that if a slope were left denuded of
its vegetation and natural surface mantle, to be a slope
of safety it must he no steeper than two to one, the
court also found that a slope of one to one would he a
slope of safety for the short distance it ran from the
outer edge of the right of way down to the point \vhere
it would interseet the two to one slope of safety, as
illustrated h!- the line BE and B C on Exhibit "A"
atta('hed to the .Judgment and attached to Defendant's
Brief. But to he a slove of safety this one to one slope
must he dressed and planted with the usual vegetation.
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'l'he court, as alreacJ)~ pointed out, made a basic findinp; that a slope, denuded of its protective surface mantle
and vegetation, to l>e a slope of safet:' should he no
steeper than two feet hori11ontal to one foot vertical.
'l'his hasie finding was modified, as above explained, to
pennit a one to one slope from the outer edge of the
right of way downward for such distance as it >vould
intersect the two to one slope or the one and a half to
one slope, illustrate<l in Exhibit "A" attached to the
Findings, Decree and Brief. Obvious];~, the eourt could
have simply found the slope of safety for the right of
way and this would automatically give a slope of saf(•t:'
for the conduit.
A reference to Exhibit "A" attached to the Findings, .Judgment, and Brief, will fully explain and reconcile the court's adoption of two slopes of safety, one
for the right of way and one for the conduit. vVe earnest].'' contend that we must start with the premise that
the right of way nmst he protected. To protect that
and leave a denuded slope the court found a two to one
slope necessary. 'J1his is shown by line G B. 'Phe court
further found that if the slope were provided with a
protective mantle of vegetation, roeks, ete., then a slope
one and a half to one would be a slope of safety. But,
sinc-e tlw evidence showed that there were partial slopes,
protected hy the natural mantle, beginning within or
next to the i33 foot right of way, which were as steep
as one to one, and sueh slopes appeared to the court
to

hf~

safe when not running too great a distance down
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the hillside, the court made a modification of the basic
findings expressed in the two to one and the one and a
half to one slopes. In some places along the conduit
the two to one slope for the right of way would he above
a two to one slope for the conduit, as shown on said
l£xhihit "A." In other places, where the slope within
the limits of the 33 foot right of way is steep, it is possible the right of way slope would be under the conduit
slope of safety. In any event, provision is made for a
termination of the one to one slope down the hillside
where it intersects either the right of way slope of safety
or the conduit slope of safety. So that under the J udgment Defendant has the option of removing the material,
illustrated in said Exhibit "A," as lying within the lines
G B E F, or within the lines G B C D. To permit this
the court found the slope of safety for the conduit as
well as the slope of safety for the right of way.
In order to maintain Defendant's position, that the
court should not have made a distinction between a slope
of safety for the right of way and a slope of safety for
the conduit, it is necessary to assume, as Defendant has
done, that all the court should or could have found was
a slope of safety for the conduit. Such position entirely
ignores the right of Plaintiff to have its right of way
33 feet wide out from the center line of the conduit safeguarded. It is this right which the Judgment of the
court is intended ultimately to protect. If the Plaintiff
has a right to have its right of way protected then the
court's Judt:,'1nent is unassailable. If the right of way
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can he ignored and Plaintiff's rights limited merely to
protecting the conduit by proper support then a fixing
of a slope of safety for the right of way might l1e
erroneous. But where the outside limits of Defendant's
right to remove gravel are hased upon a preservation
of the right of way then the fact that the court also
found a slope of safety for the conduit can have no
effec·t in the ea::-;e, so far as Defendant and its rights are
concerned, except to liberalize the right of Defendant to
remove gravel, as is graphically illustrated on said
Exhibit "A" and above explained, by opening up for
removal an additional area of gravel deposit.
That Defendant, in its position in this as well as in
other parts of its Brief, is ignoring the fact that Plaintiff
has and requires a right of way 33 feet wide out from
the center line of the conduit, is amply demonstrated
by its reliance upon the testimony of Mr. Craven, quoted
at page 81-82 of its Brief, to the effect that the conduit
will be supported if the slopes of safety commence at a
point 8 to 15 feet from the center of the conduit. The
same is true of Doctor Hintze's testimony that the slope
to protect the conduit could commence from the upper
west edge of the conduit. This, of course, would permit
Defendant to invade the 33 feet of Plaintiff's right of
way. It would have the effect of reducing Plaintiff's
right of way from 33 feet to 8 to 15 feet in the one case
and from 33 feet to nothing in the other. This we maintain would he clearly erroneous.
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Neither Craven nor llintz.e say anything about a
berm or level place along the conduit. Craven would
cover the conduit with a two foot cover of earth and
start the slope from the top of that <•.over. This is the
slope of safety for the conduit that the court adopted.
But this would ignore entirely the slope of safety to
keep the right of way inviolate. Plaintiff's witnesses,
Beers, Gardner, and .Marse1l, quoted in Defendant's
Brief pages 84-SG, all specified the necessity of having
a berm, a level place, next to the conduit 10 to 15 feet
wide, if the right of way were to be invaded within its
33 foot limit. ln addition the shoulder of that berm
should be rounded and the two to one slope start from
there and go down the hill. To create a berm 10 to 15
feet wide would require, on these slopes, the placing of
material to establish it.

Furthermore, to commence

the slope at the edge of the berm would involve a loss
of part of the 33 foot right of way and the possibility
of being unable to get the necessary passage for equipment to maintain, revair, and replace the conduit as
further contingencies might require. It should also he
borne in mind that when these witnesses of the Plaintiff
testified, as above indieated, they were not considering
a preservation of the entire 3:3 foot right of ·way to
which the Plaintiff is entitled. There is, therefore, no
real conflict between the testimony of Craven and Hintze
and that of Beers, Gardner and Marsell.
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\Ve repeat, the Plaintiff is entitled to have its right
of way protected in its entire width. The Findings and
Judgment of the court in establishing the two slopes of
safety recognize that right, and at the same time give
to Defendant more latitude in the removal of gravel
than we think it is entitled to under the basic finding
that a two to one denuded slope or a one and a half to
one slope with protective mantle are the slopes of safety.

VI.
THE JUDGMENT IS NOT INDEFINITE, VAGUE OR
AMBIGUOUS NOR IMPOSSIBLE OF COMPLIANCE BY
DEFENDANT AND INTERVENOR.

Under this heading Defendant refers to paragraph
7 of the Decree which provides that "The Decree may
be subsequently modified by the consideration of other
proposed methods of protecting Plaintiff's conduit and
right of way, and that the court hereby retains jurisdiction to he exercised hy petition of either party upon
notice to be fixed by the court, to modify, enlarge, or
otherwise change the terrm; hereof for the protection
of Plaintiff's said conduit and right of way."
Purporting to act under these provisions Defendant,
September 29, 1949, filed a petition (R. 97) requesting
the court to enter a judgment requiring Plaintiff to
stake and mark upon the ground the westerly boundary
line of its right of way, and the center line of its conduit
and to make cross-section surveys thereof and file the
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field notes and maps and records th2reof. At the hearing on this request the court stated that it was not its
intention to administer the Decree; that it retained jurisdiction under paragraph 7 only for other methods of protecting the conduit, with reference to the bank and slope.
The motion requesting the court to entertain the matter
was denied (R. 888, 889).
Paragraph 1 of the Decree definitely fixes the width
of Plaintiff's right of way as "being 33 feet wide on
the lower side closer to Wasatch Boulevard from the
center line of Plaintiff's Big Cottonwood Conduit as
constructed upon the land, said 33 feet to be measured
in a horizontal plane at right angles to the center line
of said conduit." This definitely fixes the width and location of the right of way with respect to the center line
of the conduit. The conduit itself is in place on the
ground and its exact location is readily discernible and
discoverable on the ground. Exhibit "J" is a blueprint
of the original tracing in the City Engineer's office, which
discloses the exact course and location of the center line
of the conduit. In addition the field notes are on file in
the office of the City Engineer. As counsel state, it would
be an inexpensive, mid we add, a simple, matter to locate
at any particular point the outer edge of the 33 foot right
of way, measuring out horizontally 33 feet from and at
right angles to the center line of the conduit.
If defendant sees any utility in staking off this outer
edge of the right of way it can do so. So far as the court
is coneerned, it has fixed the slopes and the limits within
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which the Defendant may operate its gravel pit. There
can be no misunderstanding on this.

rrhe Defendant

can easily and readily determine on the ground where
it may or may not remove the soil material. If Defendant honestly desires to follow and live within the terms
of the Decree it can easily do so. How any kind of survey
in advance is going to be complete and all embracing
enough to meet every contingency that may arise in the
future is difficult to understand, especially if the Defendant intends only to give lip service to the Decree, intending to do as it pleases so long as it is not caught. So
far as the City is concerned it will simply continue to
maintain its conduit. Any violations of the Decree must
originate in the Defendant's activities. If it intends to
be conscientious in its adherence to the terms of the
Decree it can readily and easily do so. If it wants to be
able at all times to produce evidence of its compliance
with the decree it can assemble for itself all the surveys,
ground markers and cross-sections it desires.
Because Defendant wants to excavate in the vicinity
of the conduit, does not cast any duty upon the Plaintiff
to furnish it with surveys, markers, profiles, or crosssections.

rrhe Plaintiff was granted an easement, as

found and fixed by the court, and it is Defendant's duty
not to invade it or violate it. That is where the duty lies
and that is where the court left it.
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VII.
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE COURT'S HOLDING THAT A SLOPE OF TWO
TO ONE IS NECESSARY WHERE THE SLOPE IS DENUDED
OF ITS PROTECTIVE MANTLE.

Under Point Vfi the Defendant states the proposition that since this is an equity case the SuprPu1e Court
may reaeh its own conclusions a:-; to the facts and ma.Y
enter a .Judg-ment consistent with its decision. \Ye do
not que:o;tion the right of this court to review the evidence and make it::; (J\\,·n Findings of F'act. However,
the rule applicable in an equity ease is stated in Doc
vs. Doe,

4~

Utah 200, 158 P. 7S1, as follow:,.;:

"\Vhile we, on appeal, may approve, lllodif~·,
or annul them, yet when specific findings are made
on material issues, respecting which the evidenre
is in eonfiict, we, because of the trial court's better
opportunity to test the credibility of witnesse:-;
and the weight of their testimony, generally approve such finding::;; unless on the reeord it is
shown, and we are persuaded, that the finding
is so clearly against the weight of the evidence
as to shm,v error."
In Wilco:<: vs. Cloward, i-l8 Utah 50i3, fiG P. 2cl 1, a
suit to foreclose a mechanics' lien, the court says:
"Jn an equity cast) it has been the rule of thi:,;
court not to disturb a finding of the lower eourt
on contested or conflicting te::;timony, unle::;s the
evidence clearly preponderates against the conclusion or finding."
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Tracy Loan and Trust Company '0'8. Openshaw
Investment Comrwny, 103 Utah 509, 132 P. 2d 388, a
suit to determine ownership of certain shares of stock
in a Utah corporation, the court said:
"If there is substantial competent evidence
which is relevant and material, a finding of the
court will not be disturbed, although the court
might well have found otherwise."

Under the foregoing rule it is not a question of mere
preponderance of the evidence, or whether the trial
court might have found, under the evidence, a steeper
slope to l>e a slope of safety. In order to sustain Defendant's position under this heading this court must go
further and reach the conclusion that the finding of the
court is so clearly against the weight of the evidence as
to show error. vVe earnestly submit that the evidence
m this record will not support such a conclusion.
rl'he Defendant's summary of the Plaintiff's evidence is so meager that we feel it necessary to make our
own statement of this evidence.
1.

PLAINTIFF'S SUMMARY OF PLAINrCJF'F'S

E~VIDENCK

Charles V. Gardner, Assistant City Engineer (R
151), who had practical experience in actually constructing slopes (R 181) such as dams, dikes, roadways, and
canals testified:
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"Q.

Having in mind your past experience and
the nature and the conditions which exist out
here, with which you are familiar, where the
defendant is operating its gravel pit, have you
an opinion as to the degree of slope that
would be necessary there to have a reasonable stable support for the Big Cottonwood
water conduit~

"A.

I would say that in my judgment that should
be not less than a 2 to 1 slope.

"Q.

By that you mean what?

"A.

I mean two feet horizontal to one foot
vertical." (R. 182)

At page 208 he testified:
"I would say the slope should start at the
right of way on the lower side of the conduit, 33
feet."
He further testified that he had observed that at
the present time the slope is eroding away where the
material is not definitely bound up by surface covering,
"it has gradually eroded away." (R. 209) On this same
page of the record in speaking of the bench made by the
Utah Railway Company he testified as follows:
"Right where this cut is made, on a line above
this work, where this here cut was made off that
block or conduit there, along the Utah Light &
Traction Company. rrhat has slid away or eroded
down, and covered over the concrete. Some places
it has entirely eroded away." (R. 209)
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The following is taken from the cross-examination
of Mr. Gardner :

"Q.

.Mr. Gardner, disregard where your right-ofway is, just put your conduit on the ground.
What, in your opinion, should constitute the
safety slope from the bottom of the conduit~

"Q.

(By the Court) From the center line, tell
us what the safety slope is~

"A.

There would be no safety slope from the
center line. The conduit would have a tendency to slope from the center line, the conduit would have a tendency to become overbalanced.

"Q.

How far out should the slope start~

"A.

I ·would say that it should start not less than
15 feet out. We should have a 15 foot berm,
not less than that, anywhere.

"Q.

(By the Court) 15 feet out from the center
line of the bottom of the conduit, from there
on what would your safety slope require?

"A.

I would say not less than two to one.

"Q.

That is your

"A.

That is my testimony." (R. 216-217)

testimony~

He further testified that this two to one slope should
continue down until it intersects with firm ground, material left intact after the excavation; that even a two to
one slope is not safe without shrubbery (R. 219).
Speaking of erosion he testified as follows:
"The worst erosion we have is at the top.
That is where our moisture \vould saturate, and
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as it free7.es and thaws, that would start sloughing
away, and it h:eeps away from the back. lt will
work back for years. It will undermine the
ground. * * * As I stated hefore, if this is not
covered with proper material, if you get a heav.'·
storm here, 1 have seen it just take that material
and saturate it to a point where it would just
slough out, just slip right out, and then .''OU
see your erosion continues. 1'hen, ag·ain, yon
have small rivulets that course down and wash
your fine stuff awa.v, and then you have the sallle
thing start over again." (R. 220-221)
Being further pressed on cross-examination he was
asked:

"Q. \V ouldn't you say a 1.8 is enough'?
"A.

No, not where the slope is denuded. I would
say we should have a two to one slope. rl'his
is denuded of all vegetation ancl wherever
the vegetation is gone we are subject to
erosion.

"Q.

(By the Court) If it is covered with brush
it may be less than two to one~

"A.

Yes."

At pag-e

2~)8

of the reconl he deserihed the different

factors entering- into the erosion process as follows:
"The erosion has several different factor::;.
You have the wind action. The wind action will
create erosion hy blowing- small particles away
from l he rock, and letting the rock fall clown the
slope.
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'"I'hen you have the storms. The storms will
run down the slope and carry the finer material,
and undermine the boulders. ]'~ventually the
boulders roll down. And then you have the freezing and thawing, and freezing and thawing is a
great factor in erosion.
"You have, at the upper edge of your slopes
you have the moisture, where the slope flattens
off the moisture will seE~Jl into the soil and freeze.
'I'hen in the spring of the year it will thaw, and
then when this thaw takes place it has a tendency
to break particles of earth loose and they will
gradually work down the slope." (R. 23R)
Mr. Gardner prepared J1}xhihits "K" and "M" which
show several eross-seetions which were taken down the
slope at the Defendant's gravel pit both in the actual
workings and to the side of the workings. 'l'he purpose
of taking these cross-sections was to get the original
natural slope so far as it was then undisturbed hy the
Defendant's workings. The first sections were run in
N ovemher, 1~l-1-8, and are represented on both Exhibits
hy a heavy black line. The sections shown on l£xhibit
"K" were run where Defendant was removing gravel.
Later surveys of these identical sections were made on
April 7, 1949, and .June 10, 1!l49, to show the amount
of excavation made after the November 1948 survey.
'l'hcse :,;urveys are represented by a heavy red line and
a broken red line, respectively. By comparing these
two red line:,; with the black line the amount of excavating in the interim can he determined. 'I'he broken green
line on

11~xhibit

"K" shows a two to one slope over the
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same cross-section as the heavy block line slope. Since
the black line shows the natural slope down to the point
where it was disturbed by the Defendant's workings, a
comparison of that line with the corresponding broken
green line will show how nearly the natural slope followed a two to one slope.
A comparison of the heavy black line with the broken
green line indicates that originally the natural slope
within the 33 foot limit of the Plaintiff's right of way
and for about 76 feet out from the center of the conduit
on cross-section "F," and about 84 feet out from the
center of the conduit on cross-section "G" was gentler
than the two to one slope shown by the broken green line.
To be precise the I£xhibit shows that the slope on crosssection "F" for said distance was 23;4, to 1 and on crosssection "H" the natural slope was slightly steeper than
2 to 1, being 1.8 to 1. That is the actual ground surface.
Cross-section "F -1" follows a 2% to 1 slope for 54 feet
(R. 212, 213). All of these cross-sections indicate that
at a point approximately 100 feet from the center of
the conduit the slope leveled out very considerably,
leaving a bench, in which bench the major part of Defendant's removal of material took place.

On Exhibit "~1" cross-section "I" shows the slope
above the conduit to be about 2 to 1 and just under 2
to 1 below the conduit for a distance of 200 feet from
the center line of the conduit. From there it follows a
2112 to 1 slope for 64 feet and then flattens out. Crosssection ",J" shows a slope of 1.8 to 1 for first GO feet
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from the conduit. Then it runs a few feet under 1.8 to 1
and then it crosses over a 2 to 1 slope in the distance
of 138 feet from the center of the conduit. It then runs
between 2:JU to 1 and 2 to 1 to 180 feet from the conduit,
and then follows a 2% to 1 to 207 feet from the conduit
flattening out to a 3 to 1 slope. On cross-section "K"
the slope is 1.8 to 1 on the first 14 feet from the center
line of the conduit. At 38 feet out it is 31;2 to 1. rrhen
it goes between 2 to 1 and 21;4 to 1 to 73 feet out from
the conduit. There it slopes 1.8 to 1 for a few feet and
then flattens out and crosses over a 2 to 1 slope. These
cross-sections appearing on Exhibit "M" were taken
immediately to the West of the Defendant's gravel removing operations (R. 215, 216).
Exhibits "K" and "M," as above shown, show that
the natural slope before Defendant commenced its operations was approximately a 2 to 1 slope and it was then
covered with its natural mantle of rocks, cementation,
and vegetation. In view of all of this information it
must be conceded that Mr. Gardner's testimony that
the Plaintiff required a 2 to 1 slope beginning at the
outer edge of the right of way is a well considered opinion and furnishes the best kind of evidence to sustain
the court in the conclusion it came to.
\V. D. Beers, who has been City F~ngineer of Salt
Lake City for approximately eighteen years and who
was a construction and locating engineer for the Reclamation Service, construction engineer for J. G. -White
and Company of New York and the Amalgamated Sugar
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Company of Ogden for ten years and who has been in
the engineering business for fifty years, testified as follows:

''Q.

'J'aking into consideration your past experience with respect to slopes and what is
neeessary for the maintenance of a reasonably stable slopE~, the eharaeter of this formation out here where the dt~fendant is operating, have you an opinion as to the slope
that should he maintained from the outer
edge of the right-of-wa~r, or from the eenter
of the conduit down toward the highway, to
furnish a reasonable stable condition?

"A.

I have, yes.

"Q.

\Vill you state what that opinion is?

"A.

In my judgment, a slope of 2 to 1 would he
the steepest slope that I would put on that,
if the vegetation is removed.

"Q.

\Vhere would

.''OU

start that 2 to 1 'g

"A. 1 would start it at the edge of the right-ofway.

"Q.

'!'he right-of-way vvhere the conduit is situated?

"A.

Yes.
'l'HI1~

COFH'l': Lot us not leave it that wa.'··
Sa.'· so many feet from the conduit.

"A.

'J'llir!y-three feet from the eenter of the
eoud.uit.

"Q.

']'hat will continue down to what point?

"A.

'l'hat would continue d.own till you reach a
flatter slope in the disintegration of the moun-
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tains and so on. You will find the flatter
slope at the lower end. It tends to flatten
out down to where it is absolutely level. rehat
is the ideal condition.

"Q.

In this particular case you have a county
highway down at the bottom, would that
furnish an area of stability that this slope
should terminate at"?

"A.

If your 2 to 1 slope struck the east part of
their right-of-way, or any part of their road,
I would say that would be stable to that point,
as long as they maintained their right-ofway." (R. 248, 249)

"Q.

(By the Court) Assuming you do that, will
that 2 to 1 slope, :3;3 feet out, start with the
lJOttom of the pipe or the middle, or the top~

"A.

That 2 to 1 slope would have to start from
the present ground.

"Q.

That

"A.

That varies up and down.

"Q.

You say thirty-three feet out-do you mean
with the drop or slope?

"A.

Horizontal distance out.

"Q.

From what?

"A.

From the center line.

"Q.

Does that mean half way up from the middle
of the conduit'?

"A.

1'he top." (H. 251, 252).

varies~

We submit that the foregoing testimony of Mr.
Beers refleets a well eonsidered opinion upon the ques-
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tion of slopes and furnishes the court very substantial
and convincing support for its conclusion made in its
Findings and .Judgment relative to tlle 2 to 1 slope being
a slope of safety.
vVe have already referred to the testimony of Doctor
R. l<J. 1\farsell, relative to his opinion as to a slope of
safety. Doctor Marse11, Associate Professor of Geology
at tlre University of Utal1, and a licensed engineer, for
a period of three years had been conducting a survey
as part of a project sponsored by the U. S. Geological
Survey to map the unconsolidated sediments in the Utah
Valley, the .Jordan Valley, and the Weber and Cache
Valleys. Doctor M.arsell was assigned to the Jordan
Valley which includes Defendant's gravel pit (R. 276).
This work has carried him into the vicinity of this gravel
pit and he has been familiar with it over a period of
fourteen or fifteen years, but extensively for three years.
His study of the Defendant's gravel pit commenced a
year before this action was filed (R. 277, 278). He saw
as a boy the work of installing this particular conduit
(R. 279). In his study of the erosive forces he selected
a spur up the canyon to the east of the Defendant's
gravel pit which presented to him a slope which had
been the least disturbed by any artificial disturbances.
This slope is depicted on Exhibit" P" prepared by Doctor
.1\[arsell. He states "this was selected as a typical profile
reproduction of the ground surface on one of the slopes
in that vicinity, that was least affected by artificial
interference from the activities of man." (H. 280). This
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slope, so selected is revealed on the panoramic photo
marked Exhibit "I" and is indicated by an ink "P" with
an arrow pointing to the top of the slope in the extreme
right part of the photo. The steepness of the slope in
terms of horizontal to vertical are given by Doctor Marsell in pages 285, 286 of the record. The steepest part of
this slope is 1.66 to 1. Parts of it are 1.73 to 1, 1.84 to 1,
1.92 to 1, 2.05 to 1, 3.48 to 1 and on down to nearly level.
Speaking of this surface, he says:

"It is what we call, in geology, a graded
surface, or a profile of equilibrium, you might say,
a stabilized surface. 'l'he nature of the slope is
that of a double curve, convex at the top, where
it merges with the flat terrace above, and concave
at the bottom where it meets the County road.
It is typical of mature surfaces wherever we find
them in nature, surfaces on hillsides that have
been created by natural processes ( R. 285).
"I might point out that on this natural slope,
with this type of material, undisturbed by the
activities of man, we have a graded slope that is
very different from a slope that we would designate as an angle of repose for such material.
'l'hat is a temporary slope; that is a slope at which
material will stand, the angle of repose. This
is not the angle of repose for this material. 'l'his
is the angle that it has assumed, under a long
continued exposure through the weathering proeesses and erosion, and at no place along the
line does it approach more closely to a slope of
1.5 to l than the minimum 1.66 to 1, which is the
profile slope that is steepest on this particular
hillside. 'l'his hillside is typical, mantled with

48
~ra~~,

with scattered brush and an occasiona1

.T uniper tree. It is the natura1 (•ondition for that
south-facing slope." (R. 287).

He then goes on to describe how the ~mrf'aee mantle
is prepared through geological processes over thousands
of years whieh make the snrfaee as it is today. Doetor
:MarscH also measured the slopes on the various spurs
and ravines between the slope marked "P" and the
Defendant's gravel operations as disclosed on Exhibit
"]." 1'hese slopes are shown on Exhibit "H." Exhibit
"Q" is a transparent overlay sheet which contains the
rate of slope shown on these various spurs and ravines
on Exhibit "H." By placing Exhibit "Q" over Exhibit
"R" these slopes can be determined.
Doctor Marsell also investigated the erosion \Vhich
was evidenced on a spur shown on Exhibit "I" and
indicated by the letter ''S" and an arrow in ink. On
his spur was to be found a place where the Utah Railway Company had, in 1899, cut a hank in order to
make its bench heretofore referred to in the evidence.
rl'he photograph shows that this break in the bank had
never healed and the erosion has continued on up the
hill leaving the area below hare of any vegetation (R.
29i3). From his measurements the witness determined
that hy the erosive processes in fifty years this cut in
the hank had migrated a distance up slope of 84 feet,
which would mean a horiz.ontal retreat of that scarp
of G:2 feet in fifty years (R. 298). He further testified
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that the Big Cottonwood Conduit was laid along side and
just below the power company's bench which is shown
on the sketch, Exhibit "R." He says:
'"I'he only slopes that I have been able to
find that are as steep or steeper than the slope
that we have mentioned so frequently, 1¥2 to 1,
are on those areas that have been affected artificially, or those surfaces that are descending to
the ravines, the slopes that descend to the ravines." (R. 294).
Speaking further of the Railway Company's bench
he says:
"Let me remind us that this is a natural
surface. With that surface carpeted with this
accumulation of boulders, talus and cobbles, and
with its grass, with its occasional brush, and to
build that power grade they made an interruption
in this normal surface. lt has been thousands of
years in attaining that condition. Naturally we
would expect that this raw surface with its scattering of boulders, through this deposit, and this
raw surface would tend to erode, and even though
that bench was never used in 50 years that have
elapsed since the power company made that grade,
that bench has been obliterated in many places
hy material raveling out of the bank, rolling
down and accumulating as talus, the talus growing, the hank wearing hack, and by wearing back
and the material rolling down on the grade line
or the flat bench, it has actually huried that bench
in lifty yean.;, over much of the area in this
region." (R. 29G).
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Exhibit "S" illustrates the slope just referred to
which has raveled back from the cut made by the Railway Company and reflects the actual conditions as they
were on l\farch 1R, 1949. This spur is 1000 feet on a
direct line southeasterly of the Walker workings (R.
297). The witness also described the erosion producing
forces much the same as Mr. Gardner hut in more detail
at page 300 of the record.
Exhibit "Y" contains 27 slide photographs, heretofore referred to, which Doctor Marsell took to illustrate
and demonstrate the erosion which took place in the
Walker pit during the winter of 1948-1949. These slides
were projected on a screen at the trial and the trial
court had the benefit of seeing just what these pictures
illustrated. It is not possible to describe what they reveal
so that this court may have the benefit of what the trial
court had before it. His explanation of the pictures as
he projected them on the screen is found in the record
on pages 304 to 329. His opinion as to the slope that
would he required to give reasonable support to the
City's conduit is found on pages 346 and 347 of the
record and is as follows:

"Q.

Now, taking into consideration the conditions
you have observed, and have testified to, here,
as they are and as they will continue to be
through the erosive forces of nature and particularly with reference to the denuded condition of the slope within a few feet of the
conduit and from there on down to the rim
of the cut, and the fact that that denuded
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condition extends horizontally along the conduit course about 94 feet, what measure of
protection would you say, Doctor, would be
required to give reasonable support to this
conduit?
"A.

I appreciate that in answering your question, that to ask that the slope that is typical
of that area, on that type of material, be
restored to a natural slope is an impractical
proposition, because we cannot put back the
vegetation, the sod, the pavement of boulders,
the concentration of lime-in other words,
we cannot recreate artificially the natural
surface that I have referred to in my testimoney. So we are forced to accept a substitute and a practical one; therefore, I would
suggest that, inasmuch as this profile on
Exhibit P shows an average slope, throughout the steeper portion of it, of 1.95 to 1,
we should ask certainly for nothing steeper,
because the substitute slope must necessarily
be a new surface created of unconsolidated
material.

"Q. What exhibit are you working with, Doctor7
"A.

This is Exhibit P. Since this average profile is typical of the profiles in the vicinity,
on the spurs, and the gravel pit is on a spur,
between ravines, for simple figuring, I think
nature has shown us that a slope of 2 to 1,
under the circumstances, would be the least
that could be expected. A slope of two to 1
is not a stable slope. Such a slope will wear
by the processes we have described, because
it is a bare slope of raw and newly deposited
material, for the most part. Therefore, I
think that even that slope would have to be

maintained by additions throughout tJ1e
years, as protection to replace tlw material
removed by erosion. 'rherefore, 1 would want
to see a berm wide enough for, I would sa:~,
ten or twelve feet or more along the eon(luit
line, on tl1e down slope side, with a rounded
shoulder, and a slope of 2 to 1 from there
on down to the plane that would intersect
the County highway. I would definitely~
from the observations I have made~oppose
any remedial measure that contemplated
leaving steep hanks and slopes that are nearly
vertical, cut hanks; for I think that we have
evidence in this region that they will wear
hack; and if we had such Eteep hanks below
our conduit, as we now have them, the:'
would wear hack in time and undermine
the structure." ( R. 346, 347).
Without quoting further from the record, we think
it is perfectly apparent that Doctor Marsell's testimony
was given only after a full and well considered investigation of all the faetors involved from actual personal
knowledge of what was occurring in this very region
here involved. Certainly such evidence would he entitled
to he relied upon by the court as the hasis for its decision
in this case.
2.

ADDT'l'lON.i\1"'

RUMMARY

OF

DJ•JFEND-

ANT'S AND TN'l'ERVENOR'S EVIDENCE.

Jn conneetion with the summary of Defendant's
and Intervenor's evidence given by the Defendant we
would like to point out the following:
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Doctor Hintze argued and dissertated on geological
principles to show that the Walker pit was a delta formation to dispute Doctor l\farsell's position that it was not
delta material. Doctor Hintze's testimony on this matter
covers about 100 pages of the transcript. He described
many rocks, introduced in evidence, and stated his reason
why this was delta formation. After he was all through,
and after he had had a night's recess to reconsider, he
came back the next morning and changed his testimony
and approved Doctor Marsell's version (R. 665). He
stated: "So I think that, for the purpose of this trial,
we are hardly justified in being too technical about the
origins of those beds which show considerable diversity,"
(R. GGG) and concludes that regardless of the origin
of the material, this does not have "any particular bearing on the question of how long this material will erode."
(R. GGR).
He stated (R. 67G):
"If the Walker workings are eventually
straightened out and smoothed down to give a
slope within the variations of slope that we see
in that immediate area, I would see no reason
to expect that the hazard at that point would be
any greater than it would he anywhere else. * ~, *
So my judgment would be that any reasonable
slope, as the slope of 1 to 1, or ll/2 to 1, or 2 to 1,
would be a reasonable slope, on a denuded slope."
(RG77).

On eross-examination he testified, in fixing the slope
at J to 1 and starting at the corner of the conduit he was
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not making any provision for a means of bringing in
material to keep the maintenance up. He was merely
answering a hypothetical question in regard to the safety
of the structure itself. He assumed the City had a right
of way so it could build a road (R. 781). We submit
that this testimony does not contradict the testimony
given by the Plaintiff's witnesses above outlined .
.John E. Kay, Assistant County Engineer, in testifying as to a slope of 1 to 1 being adequate assumed that
the City would have a berm at the conduit 33 feet wide,
the width of the right of way (R. 730). He testified that
a 2 to 1 slope, if extended up the hill from the inside
edge of the County's right of way for the highway, would
undermine the conduit. So he thought "It would be much
safer if the slope would be established which would be
at the top of the slope, as far out from the conduit as
possible. That is why I would say a 1 to 1 slope would
be safer, if that berm would be left." That berm should
consist of the natural ground in its natural condition.
If this natural surface had been dug away 18 inches to
2 feet on the berm and within 8 feet of the conduit then
the 1 to 1 slope would not be adequate (R. 731). He
would not advocate this 1 to 1 slope, or any other slope,
going to the conduit. A berm should be left (R. 732).
His preference for a 1 to 1 slope was based on its being
economically sound so far as maintaining a highway
below it was concerned. All that was necessary to maintain the highway was to haul off the material that sloughed down. There would be no concern about the raveling
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off of the slope above the highway except in terms of
hauling away the sloughed off material (R. 733). The
slope from the highway up to the conduit would be 300
to 320 feet. The length of the slope makes a difference,
a slope of that length whether you had a 1 to 1, or 1¥2 to
1, or 2 to l. The angle of repose of this material is
1¥2 to 1 (R. 734). It is apparent from this witnesse's
testimony that he was considering only the maintenance
of the highway and not a slope of stability for the conduit
and its right of way.
In connection with the testimony of L. R. Dunkley
counsel refers to Exhibit "3," being a photo of the Deer
Creek Aqueduct trench. We call the court's attention
to the fact that Exhibit "3" shows that a substantial
portion of the slope above the aqueduct and below the
City's conduit was not disturbed and still remains a
natural slope covered with its natural protective mantle
including vegetation (R. 746). Referring to Exhibit
"3" the witness testified it is his purpose when the work
is finally finished off, to refill over the aqueduct with
material, to establish the same slope it had before the
cut was made. It will be compacted with the equipment
as it is placed. We will try to smooth it all over and
we will not try to disturb the vegetation above. Between
our fill and the City's conduit 50 to 60 feet of the slope
will he covered over with vegetation, the natural ground
and natural mantle of rock (R. 760, 761). He further
testified that in his aqueduct construction they are intending the same slope as exists now which is 1¥2 to 1.
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On the svur on the gravel pit, assuming the materials
to be the same as at the Deer Creek Aqueduct revealed
in ]<~xhihit ";),"he would say that a 1lf2 to 1 or a 2 to 1
slope would be safe (R 754). On all finished slopes on
the Salt Lake A<1ueduct and numerous canal jobs the
slope of llf2 to 1 or flatter is usually used (H. 758).
Conn sel asked why a slope of 1 'l2 to l is a safe slope
so far as the Deer Creek Aqueduct is concerned-why
it is not tmfe where Defendant is concerned. 'l'he answer
to that is that there exists an undisturbed natural slope
between the a<Jneduct and the conduit with its natural
protective mantle. Further, the length of this slope is
only 50 or 60 feet while the 8lope at the Walker pit will
be 300 to 320 feet of bare, disturbed material. Furthermore, the Reclamation Service, or the Metropolitan
Water District as its successor, will be in existence and
available to make any corrections that may be needed
in this 8lope to keep it stable long after the Defendant
and its pit have disappeared.
In connection with the opinion of J. B. Walker as
to the slope of safety we 8imply refer the court to hi8
testimony as to his experience and point out that none
of it would qualify him to di8pute the testimony of the
Plaintiff's witnesses. vVe quote from page 768 of the
record.

"Q.

1 wish you would state your construetion
experienee and the work involved in such experience'?
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"A.

My construction experience dates back to
1919, and continues through to the present.
It covers largely road construction-starting
in with the first work that was done in this
County, and around the State, with the exception of some small experimental pieces of
concrete that had been put in prior to that
time. It includes railroad work, it includes
underground work of all types, and heavy
engineering, construction, which would be
classified as heavy excavation, and large
masses of concrete, road paving and general
excavation, numerous grading operations of
both heavy and light-and by "light" I mean
road work where you are possible taking off
a foot or eighteen inches, to establish a new
sub-grade."

Jack H. Craven gave his conclusion as stated by
counsel, page 110 of Defendant's brief, but went on to
say:
"But in the immediate area under discussion
here, a l:llz to 1 slope would stand, taking into
consideration that there will be some erosion on
that slope, it would 8till remain safe over a long
period of time, except under conditions which it
is impossible to design for, such a8 earthquake,
or flood or cloudbursts, of such proportions that
it would wash the natural material in that area,
to a large extent." (R. 804).
He further stated that the slope should begin at a
point 2 feet above the center of the conduit so that, as
it passed the outer edge of the bottom, there would
he about 8Yz feet from the slope to the outer bottom
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edge of the conduit (R. 805), not considering at all any
surface right of way for passage. 'rhis 1% to 1 slope
he said should be dressed and should be uniform without pockets and gullies. It would require replenishment
as time goes on, although the replenishment would not
amount to very much (R. 817).
LeRoy C. Chadwick based his opinion that a 1% to
1 slope would be adequate, "with reference to the slopes
that I saw, both along that area that appeared to have
stood there for years on end." (R. 765). That, of course,
refers to natural, undisturbed slopes with their natmal
protective mantle. Such being the case, his opinion that
a 1% to 1 slope in a raw, disturbed and denuded condition would be adequate is not of much assistance to
the court.
We submit that none of the Defendant's witnesses
took into consideration the erosive forces, the length
of the slope, the character of the materials, and the many
factors involved to arrive at a competent opinion as did
the witnesses of the Plaintiff, and especially Mr. Gardner
and Doctor Marsell. It necessarily follows that the trial
court's conclusions are based upon adequate, competent
evidence which clearly preponderates in favor of such
conclusions. We submit that under the rule stated at
the beginning of this subdivision of om Brief this comt
is bound by the trial comt's Findings and Conclusions
and the Judgment of the comt fixing the slope of 2 to 1
should be sustained.
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While the Defendant in this appeal does not question
the right of Plaintiff to bring this action to protect its
conduit and right of way, we refer the court to the following cases in which a roadway was protected by the
court from the excavating operations of the Defendant.
We believe they will furnish some assistance to the
court.

Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 1.18 N.Y.S. 337.
A part of Rockland and Jefferson Streets had been
completely destroyed by excavations made upon Defendant's property in taking out brick making material.
This action was brought to prevent destruction of that
part of Jefferson Street east of Broadway by further
excavations upon Defendant's property, which, if permitted to continue, would undermine that part of .J efferson Street still remaining. The court says:
"I am bound to find from the evidence that
what remains of Jefferson Street is in danger
of caving or sliding into the excavations already
made upon Defendant's property, unless a sufficient slope is maintained from Jefferson Street
to and upon Defendant's property, to hold and
sustain the street, and that further excavating
upon Defendant's property, in the manner in
which the work had been carried on up to the time
of the commencement of this action, would imperil
the street, and the houses and property on the
south side thereof. Already excavations have
been made upon Defendant's property up to, and
even within, the northerly line of Jefferson Street,
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and witnesses, >vho are apparently disinterested,
testified that one of the Defendants had declared
their purpose to excavate both sand and cla)~
upon their premises right up to the line of the
street. There is no doubt in my mind hut that
Jefferson Street is in imminent danger from the
excavations already made and the work threateneel to be done upon Defendant's premises and
that it can only he safe and proteeted by a judgment of the court fixing the lines and limits
within which excavations can be safely made
upon Defendant's property.
"There is a wide difference of optmon
among the experts as to what the slope of safety
should be. 'l'he plaintiff's witnesses say that in
sand there should be a slope of 2.7 feet horizontal
to 1 foot perpendicular and in clay 41;2 feet horizontal to 1 foot perpendicular; while the defendant's witnesses testified that a slope of 11/2 feet
horizontal to 1 foot perpendicular in clay is sufficient. Mr. Southard, the defendant's expert witness, testified that in his opinion the landslide
of 1906, which took away a part of Rockland
Street, was caused by excavations made in the
pump hole on the Gillies property, at a depth of
85 to 87 feet, and at a distance of from 400 to
500 feet from Rockland Street, which means, in
substance, that that slide was caused by excavations made at a slope of 5 feet horizontal to 1
foot perpendicular; and in this connection it
will be seen that the present danger to .Jefferson
Street from the excavations upon defendant's
property is apparent, from the fact that at a distance of about 244 feet north of Jefferson Street
the t)xcavations have gone to a depth of 77Ji
feet, making a slope from .Jefferson Street north
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of about 31;:4 feet to 1 foot, or considerably less
of a slope remains there for the protection of
Jefferson Street than existed on the Gillies property for the protection of Rockland Street before
it was carried away by the slide of 1906.
"So that in my opinion there is present danger of the subsidence of Jefferson Street, and
my conclusion is that the safety and preservation
of the street requires a slope in clay of 4 feet
horizontal to 1 foot perpendicular while in sand
a slope of 2¥2 feet horiwntal to 1 foot perpendicular is necessary, and that plaintiff should
have judgment enjoining the defendants from
excavating so as to further endanger .Jefferson
Street and requiring the defendants to forthwith
fill in and restore the necessary support of said
street upon their adjoining lands, with costs."
The order in this case was affirmed on appeal to
New York Court of Appeals, 102 N.Y. 54, 84 N.E. 578.
The main question passed upon was whether the city
was entitled to lateral support for its streets, since the
streets would not be left in a natural state and would
be improved. The Appellate Court held that the City
had the right to lateral support after a street was improved even though this changed the natural condition
of the surface. It was immaterial "whether the fee of
the street or highway is in the municipality or whether
it holds and controls it by a lesser title."
City of Troy v. M1.{rray, /219 N.Y.S. 6"81.
Defendant l\furray acquired a traet north of Hoosick
Street and west of Grand View Avenue in 1918. In
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1920 the City of Troy acquired a strip of land for street
purposes upon which Grand View Avenue and Valley
View Avenue are laid out as public streets. At the time
these avenues were established there was to the west
of Grand View Avenue a sand and gravel bank, the top
of which was practically on a level with the grade of
the street and the bottom about 80 feet below the street
grade. Defendant was engaged in taking the sand and
gravel from this bank. From 1922 to 1926 considerable
quantities of sand and gravel were removed from this
bank and the top was approaching Grand View Avenue
for its whole length. There was also a reduction of the
slope of the sand and gravel bank in places so as to
imperil the street. The city sought to enjoin any further
injury to the street or reducing the slope. The court
says:

"It is settled that a municipality has such
an interest in its streets or public highways,
whether it owns the fee or simply an easement
for highway purposes, to resort to the court to
prevent a destruction or impairment of the highway by removal of its lateral support. It has
also been held in Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson 192 N.Y. 54, 84 N.E. 578, 20 L.R.A (N.S.) 287
that" 'Whether the acts of persons menace the
condition of a highway in a direct manner, or
indirectly, by so digging, or excavating, upon
the adjacent lands as to affect the lateral support
and to cause, or to threaten, the subsidence of
the highway, the exercise of the equitable power
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of the court may, properly, be invoked by the
municipality in restraint of their continuance.'
"The defendant contends, however, that when
Grand View A venue and Valley View A venue
were laid out it was well known to the city that
the defendant was working the sand and gravel
bank, and that for this reason the city is estopped
from interfering with the removal by defendant
of sand and gravel from the bank up to defendant's property line. The defendant further claims
that the streets were improvidently established
as public highways, in view of their location so
near the top of the sand and gravel bank, and
in a territory where it was practically useless as
a public thoroughfare.
"Insofar as the location of the street is
concerned, that was a matter resting in the judgment of the authorities.
"Under the circumstances, I do not think
the city is estopped from asserting its right to
have the streets in question protected from caving
in. While this may be a hardship to the defendant, in that he would be required to stop carrying
on a lawful business, yet, when he purchased
his land, he took it subject to the well-settled
rules of law that he could not so use it as to cause
adjoining properties to fall into the gravel pit
by the removal of the lateral support of those
properties. * * * 'rhe plaintiff, when it obtained
a deed of the property upon which the streets
in question were laid out, had the right to assume
that, whatever business was being conducted on
nearby properties, it would not be extended so as
to de:stroy the highways the city might lay out
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upon its property. As between :Murray and his
grantor, .Murray may have had a license to remove sand and gravel from his hank up to his
line, but that license which must have existed
in parol is not binding upon the plaintiff, nor
was there anything in the record title or the
circumstances to put plaintiff in a position where
an estoppel can now he claimed as against it.
"The only evidence in the case as to the
requisite lateral support is that of the plaintiff's
engineer who testified that a slope at the ratio
of ll/2 to 1 foot would furnish sufficient support
to the streets in question. There we have a
definite measure of safety.
"An injunction may therefore issue restrainmg the defendant Murray from further removing sand and gravel from said gravel bank so
as to decrease the slope thereof from the ratio
of llj2 to one foot, taking the common boundary
line of the highways and defendant's lands on
the top of the slope."

CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt as to the right of the Plaintiff to enjoy its right of way easement across Defendant's land inviolate, without being endangered and without having imposed extra burdens in its use and maintenance.

The easement constitutes a property right.

When Defendant acquired this ]and it took it sub;ject
to the easement. A court of equity will enjoin a violation of a right of \Vay, and issue a mandatory injunction
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to compel restoration thereof, upon the same principles
as it will a fee title ownership. And where there is a
direct violation of a property right, the court is not
required to weigh equities. 'l'he fact that there is great
expense involved in undoing the encroachment as compared with the amount of damage to the holder of the
right of way is no reason for equity withholding its
injunctive powers. Longson vs. Stedman} 182 Mich. 405,
148 N.W. 738.
In its conclusion Defendant asks this court to modify
the Judgment of the trial court, consistent with this
court's decision. Such a conclusion is wholly nebulous
and moot. The question is in what particular has Defendant shown the Decree of the lower court ought to
be modified? The only possible particular here contended
for is a change of slope from 2 to 1 to 11;2 to 1, and,
we submit, this court on that issue is bound by the Findings of the trial court. If Defendant is referring to the
width of the right of way in Section 25, we submit that
width was determined by the trial court upon overwhelming evidence. As to the cross-::;ections, surveys, field
notes, stakes and markers which Defendant asks this
court to order made, we submit Defendant can do all
this without any order; that such a duty should not be
imposed upon Plaintiff who has no interest in the Defendant's removal of the gravel deposit. As to whether
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Defendant meets the requirements of the Decree in its
future operations it must be held to act at its peril.
There is no duty in the Plaintiff to take Defendant
by the hand and point out to it just where it may or
may not remove gravel. We submit the Judgment of the
trial court is supported by the weight of evidence and
is as fair to Defendant as Defendant is entitled to have
it. It should be affirmed in all respects.
Respectfully submitted,

E. RAY CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney of Salt Lake
City
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